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CONCERNING CAPITAL MARKET 
LIBERALIZATION
• IMF TRIED TO CHANGE CHARTER TO 
FORCE COUNTRIES TO LIBERALIZE 
CAPITAL MARKETS
• US TRIED TO “FORCE” KOREA TO 
LIBERALIZE CAPITAL MARKETS IN 
1993--SUCCEEDED
2AT TIME, UNSUPPORTED BY 
THEORY OR EVIDENCE
• CML DID NOT INCREASE GROWTH OR 
INVESTMENT(RODRIK) 
• CML EXPOSED COUNTRIES TO 
GREATER RISK
Growth and capital account liberalization 1975-89
Rodrik (1998)
3Investment/GDP and capital account liberalization 
1975-89 – Rodrik 1998
ADVOCACY—SPECIAL 
INTERESTS, IDEOLOGY, NAÏVE 
ECONOMICS
• FREE TRADE GOOD—THEREFORE 
FREE CAPITAL FLOWS GOOD




• With limited information or incomplete 
markets (including imperfect risk markets), 
competitive equilibria are not, in general, 
constrained Pareto efficient.
• In a second-best world an intervention 
reducing one imperfection may have 
adverse side effects.
RISK
• WITH RISK, EVEN FREE TRADE MAY 
BE WELFARE DECREASING WITH 
IMPERFECT RISK MARKETS
– NEWBERY STIGLITZ—PARETO INFERIOR 
TRADE
• CRITICISM OF CAPITAL MARKET 
LIBERALIZATION IS THAT THEY 
EXPOSE COUNTRIES TO GREATER 
RISK
5ADVOCATES CLAIMED THE CML 
WOULD REDUCE RISK
• ALLOWED COUNTRIES TO BORROW IN 
TIMES OF NEED
• PRIMARY ARGUMENT FOR EAST 
ASIA—DIDN’T NEED MORE CAPITAL
• BUT IGNORED OBVIOUS EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE:
– CAPITAL FLOWS WERE PRO-CYCLICAL
– MAJOR CAUSE OF PROBLEMS IN LATIN 
AMERICA
• ALSO IGNORED BASIC THEORY
– BANKERS LEND TO PEOPLE WHO DON’T 
NEED MONEY
• Developing countries are exposed to 
exchange rate and interest rate 
fluctuations
• Short-term flows react to perceived 
adverse shocks thereby amplifying 
fluctuations.
6• Even if there is smoothing of small shocks, 
the resulting gains under concavity are 
smaller than the losses induced by large 
shocks.
CML creates volatility
• Reversal of flows:
– During the inflow the exchange rate 
appreciates
– After the outflow financial institutions are 
weakened, the depreciated exchange rate 
increases the cost of debt servicing
• Counter-cyclical monetary policy is 
constrained. 
7Why CML does not spur growth 
and investment
• Higher output or consumption volatility 
imply a higher risk premium
• If investment depends on cash flow and 
balance-sheet effects, negative shocks 
can have particularly adverse effects
• Higher interest rate volatility exacerbates 
the previous effects
• Output and interest rate volatility decrease 
debt financing and equity markets are 
underdeveloped.
• Short-term capital is myopic and may 
determine myopic policies.
• Reserves may be unnecessarily high.
8DISCIPLINE:  ANOTHER REASON 
FOR ENHANCED GROWTH?
• The “discipline of the market place” can be 
myopic and have adverse effects on long-
term growth and stability
• Short term markets often look more at 
deficits, liabilities, not at “balance sheets”
Interventions
• GENERAL POINT:  EXTERNALITIES 
ASSOCIATED WITH SHORT TERM 
CAPITAL FLOWS, EXTERNALITIES 
REQUIRE INTERVENTIONS
• Chile and Malaysia suggest that there can 
be successful capital market regulations.
9IMF FINALLY LOOKS AT THE 
EVIDENCE
• Macroeconomic impact of CML (Prasad et 
al., 2003)
• No evidence of a positive correlation 
between financial integration and 
economic growth.
• Countries that made the effort to become 
financially integrated faced more 
instability.
Total consumption annual growth rate volatility to 
income annual growth rate volatility (medians) 





Total consumption = C + G.   
Income = output + factor income flows + terms of trade effect.









• INCONSISTENT WITH “THEORY”
• BY WHICH THEY MEAN NEOCLASSICAL 
THEORY WITH PERFECTION INFORMATION
• But failures of neoclassical open economy 
theory already well documented
• The neoclassical theory (perfect information, 
perfect capital markets, perfect competition) 
cannot explain several stylized facts.
• Obstfeld and Rogoff’s “major puzzles”, failure of 
the interest rate parity, pro-cyclical nature of 
capital movements
Imperfect information and 
rationality
• Lessons from East Asia:
– Widespread credit rationing due to imperfect 
and asymmetric information
– Excessive leverage and the relevance of 
financial structure
• Market imperfections and irrationalities 
play a central role in economic fluctuations 
(irrational exuberance/pessimism)
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Types of capital flows 
• If FDI’s have a positive effect on growth, 
and the aggregate effect is nil, then short-
term flows have a negative effect.
FDI’s may not generate growth
• FDI’s include revenues from privatizations 
which may or may not be welfare-
increasing
• Natural resource curse.
• Foreign banks acquiring domestic banks 
may reduce financing to SME’s.
• Foreign banks may contract credit in the 




• Problems in identifying empirically the 
effect of good governance.
• Good governance does not eliminate 
information imperfections and 
irrationalities.
FORMAL MODELS
• EASY TO CONSTRUCT MODELS WITH 
CREDIT RATIONING, IMPERFECT 
CAPITAL MARKETS, OVERLAPPING 
GENERATIONS IN WHICH CAPITAL 
MARKET LIBERALIZATION LEADS TO 
INCREASED VOLATILITY, LOWER 
WELFARE
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Regime changes and volatility
• There are two states of nature: 1 and 2 (1 is the bad state) following a Markov 
chain with constant transition probability .
• In both states there are two projects: risky 
(R) and safe (S). Both projects last two 
periods.
• Monitoring of project undertaken is 
impossible. Loans are variable rate.
• i
j(r, r’) ; j = S , R ; i = 1 , 2 is the 
expected return for the borrower of 
– investment j 
– undertaken in state i 
– when the interest rate changes from r to r’ in 
case of a regime change (if no change 
happens, then the interest rate will remain 
constant at r) 
• The outcome of the project depends on 
the state of nature in the second period.
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• Take the set of state-dependent interest 
rates {r1 , r2}i ; i = 1 , 2 such that the safe 
project is incentive-compatible.
• Let i (r1 , r2) be the expected return to the 
lender of a loan
– made in state i = 1 , 2 
– for given incentive-compatible {r1 , r2}
• Let * be the safe international rate of 
return and assume
Max 1 (r1 , r2)  < * < Min 2 (r1 , r2) 
• There are M* safe projects each costing a 
dollar.
• Aggregate output is given by
Yi = [ X + G + I ] / [m + s(i)]
• Where exports and government spending 
are fixed, m is the marginal propensity to 
import and s(i) is the marginal propensity 
to save ( s’ > 0 ).
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• Closed financial markets
–  adjusts to equate savings and 
investments.
– In the good state I = M*.
– In the bad state I < M* and the interest 
rate is the maximum such that the safe 
investment is undertaken.
– There is no output variability
Yi = [ X + G ] / m ; i = 1 , 2
• Open financial markets
– s* = s(*)
– In the good state all safe investment 
projects are undertaken; in the bad state 
there is no interest rate at which it is 
profitable to invest.
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• Opening the capital market lowers output 
in the bad state and may increase output 
in the good state if the country borrows 
abroad.
• Capital flows are pro-cyclical. 
• The effect on consumption is ambiguous.
Incomplete risk markets
• Two-period OLG model
Uj(c1 , c2) = ln(c1) + ln(c2) 
c1 = wt – st
c2 = (1 + rt+1)st
• Foreigners only lend to enterprises. 
• The international interest rate is variable.
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Deterministic domestic technology
• The production function is neoclassical 
Qt = F(Kt , Lt) = Lt f(kt) = f(kt) 
• Capital depreciates completely each 
period. 
• The closed economy
– the law of motion of capital is
kt = st-1 = .5 wt-1 = .5 g(kt-1)
– The steady state is: k* = .5g(k*)
• The open economy:
– kt = f’-1(1+rt)  h(rt)
– The expected utility of a generation at time t is 
Et [U] = -2ln(.5) + 2ln(wt) + Et [ln(1+rt+1)]
– The ex-ante expected utility is
E{Et[U]} = -2ln(.5) + 2E[ln(wt)] + E[ln(1+rt+1)]
– If the economy is at its steady state, 
CML unambiguously leads to an 
increase in consumption variability.
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• Impact on social welfare:
– Assume E[ln(1+rt)] = ln(1+rc) and a utilitarian 
social welfare function.
– In the open economy (t the income share of 
K): 
 w/  ln(1+r) = - t /(1- t) = [(dLt/dKt)|isoquant ]kt
The effect on social welfare depends on 
 [(dLt/dKt)|isoquant ]kt /  ln(1+rt) = A [1 – -1] 
A>0 ;  the elasticity of substitution between K 
and L
• If  < 1, ln(w) is a concave function of 
ln(1+rt) and social welfare is decreased.
• If the social welfare function is 
inequality/risk averse, welfare is reduced 
even if >1 (provided it is not too large).
19
Stochastic domestic production
• If Qt = t f(kt), then kt = .5 t-1 g(kt-1)
• In the closed economy:
Et Uj = -2 ln .5 + 2ln wt + Et ln (t+1) 
+ ln[f’(wt/2)]
• Assuming E[ln(t)] is a martingale,
E{Et[Uj]} = - 2ln(.5) + 3E[ln(t)] 
+ 2E[ln g(kt)] + E[ln f’(.5 t g(kt))]
• In the open economy:
Et Uj = -2 ln .5 + 2ln wt +  Et [ln (1 + rt+1)]
• kt = h(rt/ t) ;  wt = t g[h(rt/ t)]
• With constant international interest rate:
E{ Et Uj } = - 2ln(.5) + 2E[ln(t)] 
+ 2E[ln g(h(r/t))] + ln (1+r)
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• CML allows for greater variability of wages 
(when  is high the country can borrow 
more and vice versa)
• High wages today have no adverse effect 
on the interest rate at t+1
• If the social welfare function is sufficiently 
inequality/risk averse, social welfare is 
decreased.
• Can the access to more resources 
counteract the losses from greater 
variability?
• Consider a unitary elasticity technology 
and a utilitarian social welfare function.
• Assume that E[ln(1+rc)]=ln(1+r0).
• Then E[ln(wc)] = E[ln(wo)] and the 
expected utility at time t is the same in the 
closed and open economy.
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• However, generational utility is
Ln(.5 wt) + ln(.5 wt (1+rt+1))
where wt and rt+1 are negatively correlated 
in the closed economy.
• It follows that there is less utility variability 
and higher social welfare before CML.
• With CML:  ln(w)/  ln  = 1 / (1- ) 
• Thus, variations in  generate large 
variations in wages and therefore in 
lifetime utility, particularly if the share of 
labor is small. 
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• In a closed economy life-time consumption 
of the young does not increase in tandem 
with productivity.
• Moreover, the benefits of a productivity 
shock are shared with future generations.
• With CML the interest rate does not 
depend on the country’s own savings.
• Productivity shocks affect only the 
generation working at the time of the 
shock.
FUTURE RESEARCH
• Neoclassical open economy modelling is 
at a dead-end—too many puzzles that 
cannot be explained
• Theories of asymmetric information, 
imperfect risk markets hold open promise 
of an alternative open market macro-
economy
– Better descriptions of what has happened
– Markedly different policy prescriptions
